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THE GRANGER-CAUSALITY BETWEEN MONEY 
GROWTH, INFLATION, CURRENCY DEVALUATION AND 





This paper uses annual data for the period 1954-2002 to investigate 
the causal relationship between money growth, inflation, currency 
devaluation and economic growth in Indonesia. Three testable 
hypotheses are investigated: (1) does the money supply growth 
Granger-cause inflation? (2) does currency devaluation Granger-
cause inflation? (3) does inflation affect e conomic growth? The 
empirical results suggest that there existed a short-run bi-directional 
causality between money supply growth and inflation and between 
currency devaluation and inflation. For the complete sample period, 
the causality running from inflation to narrow money supply growth 
was stronger than that from narrow money supply growth to 
inflation. This result is consistent with the view that in a high-or 
hyperinflationary economy, inflation does have a feedback effect on 
money supply growth and this generates a self-sustaining 
inflationary process. The short-run bi-directional causality between 
currency devaluation and inflation was, however, weak or not so 
robust for the complete or any shorter sample period. On the 
relationship between inflation  and economic growth, the results 
suggest that there was no short-run causality from inflation to 
economic growth for the complete or any sub-sample period. 
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1. Introduction  
 
   Indonesia is considered an inflation-prone country largely because 
of its inflation history in the 1950s and early 1960s when it was on 
the verge of ‘hyperinflation’ and economic collapse ( Arndt, 1971; 
Hill, 1996; Thomas and Drysdale, 1964; Sundrum, 1973). 
Indonesia’s high inflation during the 1950s and early 1960s had 
fiscal-monetary roots (Aghevli and Khan, 1977; Arndt, 1971; Corden 
and Mackie, 1962; Hicks, 1966; Mackie, 1967). The political change 
in 1966 and subsequent stabilization and economic reforms in this 
country brought its inflation rate down to a single digit level within a 
short period of time. 
 
   Since the late-1960s to the late-1990s Indonesia experienced 
moderately high inflation on average within the range of about 10-12 
percent per annum, except during three supply/external shocks. The 
first was the OPEC oil shock during 1973-1974 when Indonesia’s 
inflation rose to about 35 percent per annum. The second was the 
OPEC oil shock during 1979-1980 when Indonesia’s inflation was 
about 20 percent per annum. The third was the Asian currency crisis 
during 1997-1999 that hit the Indonesian economy, and later its 
society and polity, the most. During the peak of the crisis in 1998, 
Indonesia’s inflation rose to about 60 percent. This was a transitory 
phenomenon, and it did not lead to hyperinflation as many feared 
presumably because a set of IMF-supported stabilization  policies 
were already in place.  
 
   Although monetary targeting of o ne form or the other was the 
preferred strategy of monetary policy in Indonesia since the late 
1960s to 2003, to what extent inflation in this country originated 
from an excess money supply under different exchange rate regimes 
remains unknown. In a related paper for Indonesia (Hossain, 2005a), 
it is found that the consumer price index (CPI), the stock of narrow 
(M1) or broad money (M2) and real permanent income form a 
(weakly) cointegral relationship for the sample period 1952-2002. 
This relationship has b een found broadly stable for several sub-
samples, especially when the model is estimated with a narrow 
definition of money.  One theoretical implication of cointegration is Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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that if two variables, say, consumer price index and the nominal 
money stock, are integrated of order one and cointegrated, there must 
be a Granger-causality (Granger, 1969) between inflation and money 
supply growth in at least one direction as one variable can help 
determine the other.  
 
   This paper provides an overview of the sources  of inflation and 
investigates the causal linkage between money supply growth, 
inflation, currency devaluation and economic growth in Indonesia for 
the period 1954-2002.
1 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the s ources of inflation in 
Indonesia since the 1950s. Section 3 specifies the Granger-causality 
test models. Section 4 reports the test results between money supply 
growth and inflation. Section 5 reports the test results between 
devaluation and inflation. Section 6 reports the test results between 
inflation and economic growth. Section 7 summarizes the findings 
and draws conclusion. 
 
2. Sources of Inflation in Indonesia  
 
The Soekarno-Era: 1950-1965 
There is consensus that high inflation in Indonesia during the 
Soekarno regime originated from the monetization of sustained 
budget deficits, especially since the late 1950s. Therefore, it does not 
make much difference whether one postulates that Indonesia’s high 
inflation during this period was a fiscal or a monetary phenomenon. 
In general, the money growth rate and inflation are highly correlated 
and in most high inflationary countries, there exists a bi-directional 
causality between money supply growth and inflation. In a high-
inflationary situation, inflation affects budget deficits, which, when 
financed by money creation, fuel the inflationary process. Thus, 
budget deficits become intertwined with both money supply growth 
and inflation. This was the story behind Indonesia’s high inflation in 
the 1950s and early 1960s.  
 
   However, the debate remains whether large budget deficits during 
the Soekarno era were due to the government’s over-ambitious 
programs of economic development once the country gained formal International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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independence from the Dutch in 1949 and/or were the outcome of 
exogenous economic shocks and political developments. Thomas and 
Drysdale (1964:p.548) have suggested that Indonesia’s large budget 
deficits in the 1950s and early 1960s originated not from any drive 
for economic development but due to political reasons:  
 
It is our view that Indonesian experience throws no light, one 
way or the other, on the pros and cons of inflationary financing 
for development. Inflation in Indonesia was the result, not of a 
drive for economic development, but of a continued, though 
inconclusive, struggle for power (at least until 1959), the 
consolidation of territorial claims, a system of civil service 
“patronage”, and defence spending, financed primarily through 
government deficits. The existence of the Five-year Plan 1956-
60 i s no evidence to the contrary. The plan represented a 
compilation of data submitted by the various government 
departments, data which economic policy at no stage served to 
co-ordinate. 
 
Glassburner (1971:p.71) has given a similar interpretation of the 
government’s expansionary economic policies during 1950-1957:  
 
… from the point of view of economic policy, the years 1950 
to 1957 in Indonesia are best understood as years of a hopeless 
losing battle on the part of a very small group of pragmatically 
conservative political leaders against an increasingly powerful 
political coalition of generally radical orientation. 
 
Mackie (1967:p.3) has extended this view for the early 1960s:  
 
The underlying cause of the inflation, in my opinion, has been 
Indonesia’s unresolved political crisis of the last ten years; the 
outward political stability of 1960-64 was misleading, for it 
was largely contingent upon budget deficits which represented 
a failure to resolve fundamental problems. 
  
   He has, however, emphasized that t here were institutional 
constraints that prevented the Soekarno government from Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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undertaking an overtly expansionary fiscal policy during the early 
1950s and that might have kept inflation under control until the 
late 1950s:  
 
Until the end of 1956, Indonesian governments were restrained 
in their use of deficit financing as a way to cope with their 
budget problems because of several political considerations 
which ceased to apply during 1957. The Bank Indonesia Act 
of 1953 imposed a statutory requirement that the Bank must 
retain gold and foreign exchange reserves to the value of 20% 
of its advances. This meant, virtually, that the government’s 
indebtedness to the central bank could not exceed five times 
the nation’s current gold and foreign exchange holdings 
without resorting to the emergency provisions of the Act 
which required the approval of Parliament.  Hence there was a 
significant legal and political limit to the extent to which the 
supply of money could be inflated… [However]… both these 
restraints were swept away by the political crisis brought on by 
the regional revolts of early 1957 (Mackie, 1967:p.22). 
 
   Thus the impression one gets from the early writings on this 
issue is that Indonesia’s high-inflationary episode in the late 
1950s and early 1960s was due to some exogenous factors and 
was not the outcome of any populist economic policy paradigm of 
the Soekarno regime,  a la  macroeconomic populism of Latin 
America. This is reflected in the fact that instead of increasing 
government expenditures, the  sharp rise in budget deficits since 
the late 1950s was due to a sharp decline in government revenues. 
For example, the government revenue as a proportion of GDP fell 
sharply from a relatively high level of 13 percent in 1960 and 
1961 to an average of only  4.6 percent during 1962-1966; the 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP declined but to a relatively 
smaller extent and remained at an average level of 9.8 percent 
during this period. The result was a sharp increase in budget 
deficits to the level of 5.1 percent of GDP during 1958-1966 
(Table 1). Therefore, it appears that, after remaining within the 
range of about 20-25 percent throughout the 1950s, the inflation 
rate started to accelerate in 1957 when budget deficits, financed International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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mostly by money creation (Table 2), increased from 1.1 percent to 
3.2 percent and increased further during the next few years.  
 

























































































































































Source: Author’s compilation based on Aghevli and Khan (1977).  
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   The s harp decline in government revenues was due to fall in 
foreign trade taxes. Between 1960 and 1966 the value of recorded 
exports declined from US$841 million to US$679 million, partly 
due to adverse trends in the world prices of rubber and other 
exportable  products of Indonesia and partly because of the 
declining exportable surpluses and the diversion of exports into 
unrecorded trade. Also, the sharp appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, under a fixed exchange rate system, encouraged 
smuggling and both under-invoicing of exports and over-
invoicing of imports. Further, the government’s capacity to tax 
decreased with the breakdown of tax administration because of 
the erosion of the purchasing power of salaries of government 
employees (Sundram, 1973). Corden and Mackie (1962:pp.39-40) 
have elaborated the balance-of-payments problems and their 
implications on budget deficits and inflation: 
 
   There has been severe and practically continuous price inflation 
since 1953… The cause of the inflation has been government 
budget deficits financed by credit creation. … The effect of the 
inflation has been to place continuous pressure on the balance of 
payments… As a result the inflation has made inevitable the 
progressive devaluation of the rupiah, twice a formal devaluation 
of the official exchange rate, and at other times  de facto 
devaluation by the use of various indirect devices. 
 
   The export or repatriation of capital from Indonesia has in 
general been prohibited. Furthermore, other than for the 
petroleum companies, there have been increasing delays in the 
granting of approval to repatriate profits. At the same time there 
has certainly been a strong desire to send money abroad, partly 
due to the lack of confidence of foreign enterprises in their 
prospects in Indonesia, whether due to inflation or to political 
reasons, partly due to the exclusion of Chinese businessmen from 
village retailing and a large range of importing, and partly due to 
expectations of further devaluation of the rupiah. 
 
   One result is that traders have attempted to understate the 
foreign currency values of exports and overstate the values of International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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imports in order to build up balances abroad. Another result has 
been the actual smuggling of exports out of the country. The aim 
of exporting capital has provided one reason for the attempts to 
evade currency regulations. The other motive has been to evade 
payments of trade taxes, by avoiding the spread between the 
rupiah proceeds of exporters and the rupiah payments of 
importers. These two motives have presented the Indonesian 
exchange control authorities with the continuous problem of 
ensuring that the flow of currency payments passes through 
official channels and that, when it does, exports and imports are 
valued correctly. 
 
   Table 2 shows that the major contributors to changes in the 
narrow money supply growth since the mid-1950s to mid-1960s 
were borrowings by both the government and public enterprises. 
As pointed out earlier, the money supply growth rate was 
moderately high in the 1950s on a sustained  basis but not 
excessive until 1960 given that there was rapid monetization of 
Indonesia’s economy in the 1950s with an estimated income 
elasticity of demand for narrow money at about two (Hossain, 
2005a). This helped to keep the inflation rate within control. This 
phenomenon is reflected in the ‘puzzling’ sharp decline in the 
velocity of money in the midst of double-digit inflation until there 
was the obvious sharp rise in income velocity of money during 
hyperinflation. Thomas and Drysdale (1964:p.547) have given a 
political interpretation of the decline in income velocity of money 
prior to hyperinflation:  
 
… in conditions of persistent inflation, the public would 
sooner or later have moved from money into goods, implying 
a decline in the demand for money or a rise in the velocity of 
circulation. In developing economies, monetization of the 
subsistence sector usually leads to a secular decline in 
velocity. But this could not possibly account for the magnitude 
of the decline in velocity in Indonesia during the 1950s. The 
real explanation would appear to be a widespread and 
increasing tendency to hoard cash, induced primarily by 
increasing political uncertainty. This interpretation derives Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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some support from the fact that the decline in velocity seems 
to have accelerated in the year after 1957. If this explanation is 
correct, it implies that until about 1960 a growing 
precautionary demand for money (hedging against political 
uncertainty) prevailed over any tendency towards a flight into 
goods (hedging against inflation). Money illusion remained 
strong enough to preclude any development of hyper-inflation. 
This hoarding had a stabilizing effect on the monetary 
situation: it dampened the effects of a rapidly rising money 
supply on the price level and money income. 
 
Table 2. Changes in the Money Supply in Indonesia: 1955-1966 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on Arndt (1971: p.368). 
 
The Soekarno-Era and Thereafter: 1966-2002 
The failed ‘military coup’ in October 1965 gradually and effectively 
brought Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ government in power in 1966. The 
new government introduced a wide range of IMF-World Bank-
supported stabilization and reform measures, including the removal 
of restrictions on trade and capital flows. These measures opened the 
economy for foreign investment, increased aid flows and moved the 
economy to a higher growth path within two years. By 1970 the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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inflation rate was brought down to a single digit level. Thee Kian 
Wie (2003:p.23) suggests that the main policy instrument for price 
stability was the introduction of a balanced-budget strategy:  
 
Upon assuming power in 1966, Soeharto asked his economic 
team to draw up a Programme for Stabilization and 
Rehabilitation. The main objective of the Programme was the 
stabilization of the economy by stopping the runaway 
inflation. The main policy instrument was a balanced budget, 
based on the principle that the government should not resort to 
the printing of money to finance budget deficits. To make this 
policy more feasible, the estimated revenues in the balanced 
budget would also include revenues from foreign aid…. The 
new government’s reliance on foreign aid as a source of 
financial support for the budget was a far cry from the anti-
Western “go to hell with your aid” attitude of President 
Sukarno. 
 
   Hill (1996) suggested inflation control of the new government as a 
major achievement. He commented on it generously: ‘The Soeharto 
government tackled inflation surprisingly quickly and effectively. 
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the regime since 1966 has been its 
commitment to control inflation’ (Hill, 1966:p.30). However, in 
reality, the Soeharto government’s commitment to control inflation 
was at best half-hearted, given that the government maintained a 
high-growth development strategy during the next three decades 
when price stability became subordinate to economic growth. 
 
   This follows the fact that the goals of monetary policy in Indonesia 
since the beginning of the Soeharto government until the currency 
crisis in July 1997 were designed to  achieve m ultiple objectives, 
including price and exchange rate stability and economic growth. 
The monetary policy was conducted through controlling monetary 
aggregates ￿ narrow money (M1) and broad money (M2) ￿ under a 
fixed/pegged or a ‘managed floating’ exchange  rate arrangement. 
This strategy of monetary policy was apparently in the lines of 
monetary targeting where the (broad) monetary aggregate was used 
as an intermediate target, and open-market operations were Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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   Monetary policy conducted through a ‘soft-form’ of monetary 
targeting was not successful in maintaining the monetary growth rate 
at its target level and thereby achieving one of its goals: price 
stability, meaning low and stable inflation. To begin with, as 
Indonesia maintained an open capital account since the late-1960s, it 
did not have a high degree of monetary policy independence under a 
fixed or pegged exchange rate  system.
3 External developments 
contributed to most changes in the money supply and the open-
market operations were not effective in maintaining the desired 
growth rate of the money supply, as yields were set administratively 
at low levels, not market determined (McLeod, 1993). Therefore the 
money supply in the m edium to long-term became an endogenous, 
rather than an exogenous policy, variable. Moreover, given the 
ambiguities of monetary targeting under a fixed or pegged exchange 
rate system, Bank Indonesia did not gain monetary policy credibility 
for achieving price stability. In fact, it was not the money supply 
growth rate per se but the exchange rate that acted as the nominal 
anchor to  inflation.
4 The resulting inflationary outcome was not 
satisfactory. Although Indonesia has a high degree of economic 
openness, its non-tradable goods sector remains large. Therefore the 
actual inflation rate, which is the weighted average of the inflation 
rates in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, diverged significantly 
from that of the pegged currency country (US) and also exhibited a 
high degree of volatility.
5  
 
   Thus, in brief, the inflation-and monetary history of Indonesia does 
not suggest that a simple monetary model of inflation under a 
flexible exchange rate system would be appropriate for this country 
for the sample period of this study. The key issue is whether a 
monetary model of inflation is appropriate under a fixed or a pegged 
exchange rate system when the money supply becomes endogenous. 
Also, the issue is to what extent any excess money supply in an 
economy  operating under a fixed/pegged or managed floating 
exchange rate system is adjusted through the price level, rather than 
through changes in foreign reserves. Such theoretical issues are International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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beyond the scope of this paper. However, to complement the results 
in  Hossain (2005a), this paper investigates some testable hypotheses 
within the Granger-causality framework.  
 
3. Specification of the Granger-Causality Models  
 
The Bivariate Granger-Causality Model  
   Given that there exists a cointegral relationship between money, 
prices and output, a bivariate Granger-causality model of the 
following form can be specified for testing causality between money 
supply growth (Dln Mj) and inflation (Dln CPIt) (Enders, 1995; Roca, 
2000): 
 
Dln CPIt = constant + r1 ECt-1 + Sai Dln Mjt-i + Sdi Dln CPIt-i + error 
term 
Dln Mjt = constant + r2 ECt-1 + Sbi Dln CPIt-i + Sgi Dln Mjt-i + error 
term 
 
where ECt-1 is one period lagged error-correction term in the 
cointegral relationship, Mj(j = 1,2) is the narrow (M1) or broad (M2) 
money stock, CPI is the consumer price index, and as per the 
Granger representation theorem at least one of r1 and r2 is nonzero.  
 
   A negative and significant coefficient r1 or r2 would indicate the 
presence of a long-run causal relationship between money growth 
and inflation. If, for example, only  r1 is significant, this would 
suggest a unidirectional causality from money to prices, implying 
that money drives prices toward long-run equilibrium but not the 
other way around. If both  r1 and  r2 are significant, they would 
suggest a bi-directional causality between money growth and 
inflation. This interpretation of Granger causality in a cointegrated 
system has been emphasized by Enders (1995). According to him, in 
a cointegrated system, {zt} does not Granger cause {yt} if lagged 
values Dzt-i do not enter the Dyt equation and if yt does not respond to 
the deviation from long-run equilibrium’, which is represented by the 
error-correction term in the short-run model. In the above 
specification, the lagged terms of Dln CPIt and  Dln Mjt appear as Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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explanatory variables, indicating the short-run cause and effect 
relationship between these two series. Thus if the lagged coefficients 
of Dln Mjt are significant in the regression of Dln CPIt, this means that 
money growth causes inflation in the short run.  
 
The Trivariate Granger-Causality Model  
   Although the above specification is considered adequate, for the 
present study the Granger-causality model is specified in an 
expanded form for testing causality between money supply g rowth 
and inflation and between inflation and economic growth: 
 
Dln CPIt = constant + r1 ECt-1 + Sai Dln Mjt-i + Sdi Dln CPIt-i + Shi 
Dln y
p
t-i + error term  
Dln Mjt = constant + r2 ECt-1 + Sbi Dln CPIt-i + Sgi Dln Mjt-i + Sni 
Dln y
p
t-i + error term  
Dln y
p
t = constant + r3 ECt-1 + Sei Dln CPIt-i + Sii Dln Mjt-i + SJi Dln 
y
p
t-i + error term 
 
where y
p is a measure of permanent income and other variables have 
been defined earlier. 
 
   This expanded model is appropriate to examine the short-run 
causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation 
conditional on the growth of real permanent income. Any causality 
between currency devaluation and inflation can also be tested within 
this framework. The third equation in the above specification is used 
for testing the effect of inflation on economic growth.  
 
   In the specification, i can take an infinite value, but in practice, it 
takes a finite value. The definition of Granger-causality in the limited 
sense, or ‘precedence’ à la (Leamer, 1985), implies that the money 
supply growth is causing inflation provided that in the regression of 
inflation on lagged inflation, lagged money growth and lagged output 
growth rates, the sum of the coefficients of money growth rates, that 
is,  Sai, i = 0,2…, is not statistically zero. Similarly, inflation is 
causing money supply growth provided that in the regression of 
money supply growth on lagged money growth, lagged inflation and International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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lagged output growth rates, the sum of the coefficients of inflation, 
that is,  Sbi, i = 0, 1 ,2…, is not statistically zero. If both of these 
events occur, this would indicate a feedback relationship between 
inflation and money supply growth. Again, as per the third equation 
in the specification, inflation is causing output growth provided that 
in the regression of output growth on lagged output growth, lagged 
inflation and lagged money growth rates, the sum of the coefficients 
of inflation, that is, Sei, i = 0, 1,2…, is not statistically zero.  
 
   In applying the test for Indonesia, the lag length is sequentially set 
at 1, 2 and 3 years because causal inference is usually sensitive to the 
choice of lag length. Given the relatively small sample size, the 
maximum lag length of 3 years is considered long enough for the 
explanatory variables to have their impact realized on the dependent 
variable.
  In general, a premature truncation of the lag length may 
ignore the significant connection that exists in the relationship. 
 
4. The Granger-Causality Between Money Growth and Inflation 
 
   Table 4 reports the short-run causality test results in a summary 
form. The results suggest that there is a strong causality running from 
inflation to narrow money supply growth for the complete sample 
period. This result remains robust with the narrow definition of 
money in the regression model.
6 This finding is consistent with the 
idea that high inflation generally has a pronounced impact on money 
supply growth. When inflation rate is high, the government attempts 
to extract resources from the private sector by printing money (and 
spending it) at a faster rate than the rate of inflation to cover rapid 
loss of real revenues. This gives a strong bi-directional relationship 
between money supply growth and inflation. When the inflation rate 
is low, the impact of inflation on fiscal deficits is not pronounced; 
hence, any causality running from inflation to money supply growth 
may not be strong enough to be detected by a statistical test. As the 
rate of inflation in Indonesia remained moderately high throughout 
the sample period, t he impact of inflation on money supply growth 
was statistically significant. However, the causality running from 
money supply growth to inflation is weak and remains sensitive to Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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the lag length. This indicates that the money supply growth, under a 
fixed/pegged exchange rate system, was more an endogenous, rather 
than an exogenous policy, variable, determined by factors in the 
money demand function, such as inflation, interest rates, exchange 
rates and real output.  
 
Table 3. The Short-Run Granger-Causality Between Money Supply 
Growth and Inflation 
A. Regression Model
 
Dln CPIt = constant + r1 ECt-1 + Sai Dln Mjt-i + Sdi Dln CPIt-i + Shi 
Dln y
p
t-i + error term 
With Narrow Money Supply Growth (Dln M1) 




























F(1,44) = 5.05* 
F(2,40) = 0.19 















F(3,21) = 2.13 











F(3,21) = 0.14 
B. Regression Model 
Dln Mjt = constant + r2 ECt-1 + Sbi Dln CPIt-i + Sgi Dln Mjt-i + Sni Dln 
y
p
t-i + error term 







F(1,44) = 20.69** 
F(2,40) = 13.78** 
F(3,36) = 12.70** International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 



















F(1,7) = 0.83 
F(2,3) = 1.00 
 
F(1,11) = 3.76 
F(2,7) = 1.69 
 
F(1,27) = 0.21 
F(2,24) = 0.07 
F(3,21) = 4.47* 







F(1,27) = 0.13 
F(2,24) = 0.58 
F(3,21) = 0.21 
Notes:  
a   The F-statistic value is obtained by the variable deletion test. The 
figures in parentheses are the degrees of freedom 
*   significant at the 5 percent level, implying a causality running from 
money supply growth (inflation) to inflation (money supply 
growth). 
**   significant at the 1 percent level, implying a causality running from 
money supply growth (inflation) to inflation (money supply 
growth). 
 
5.The Granger-Causality between Currency Devaluation and 
Inflation 
 
   If the money growth rate is not the main source of inflation, 
currency devaluation may be considered a supplementary, if not an 
independent, source of inflation. The procedure generally adopted for 
examining whether devaluation is an independent source of inflation 
has three main parts, arranged in a sequential manner (Hossain, 
2002). The first part involves testing for a cointegral relationship 
between the consumer price index (CPI), the narrow (M1) or the 
broad (M2) money stock, and permanent income (y
p). The presence 
of a cointegral relationship among these variables is interpreted as a 
long-term price-level relationship, derived from an equilibrium 
condition in the money market. The second part of the procedure 
involves investigation of the short-term effect of devaluation on Hossain, A.   Granger-causality between inflation, money growth in Indonesia 
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inflation. This can be done by estimating an error-correction model 
of inflation in which devaluation, a stationary variable, is included 
with the contention that it may have a short-term effect on inflation. 
The third part of the procedure involves investigation of the feedback 
effects between inflation and devaluation. Given that the first and 
second parts of the procedure have been conducted in Hossain 
(2005b), the third part of the procedure involves the conduct of the 
Granger causality test between devaluation and inflation within the 
error-correction modeling framework specified above.  
 
   Table 4 reports the test results. They suggest that there is only a 
weak bi-directional causal relationship between inflation and 
devaluation and that the results are sensitive to the lag-length. This 
indicates that devaluation was not a major or an important source of 
inflation in Indonesia. 
 
Table 4. The Granger-Causality Between Devaluation and Inflation 
Effect of Devaluation on Inflation  
(With Narrow Money Supply Growth, Dln M1) 
Regression Model 
Dln CPIt = constant+ r4 ECt-1+ Sbi Dln CPIt-i +SgiDln M1t-i +Sni Dln 
y
p
t-i + Ski Dln ERt-i + error term 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 








F(1,30) = 2.67 
F(2,25) = 0.57 
F(3,20) = 0.59 
Effect of Devaluation on Inflation  
(With Broad Money Supply Growth, Dln M2) 
Regression Model 
Dln CPIt =constant + r5 ECt-1 +Sbi Dln CPIt-i +SgiDln M2t-i +Sni Dln 
y
p
t-i + Ski Dln ERt-i + error term 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 








F(1,30) = 3.37 
F(2,25) = 0.77 
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Effect of Inflation on Devaluation 
(With Narrow Money Supply Growth, Dln M1) 
Regression Model 
Dln ERt =constant+ r6 ECt-1+ Sei Dln CPIt-i +SiiDln M1t-i +SJi Dln 
y
p
t-i + SVi Dln ERt-i + error term 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 








F(1,30) = 2.65 
F(2,25) = 0.31 
F(3,20) = 0.61 
Effect of Inflation on Devaluation 
(With Broad Money Supply Growth, Dln M2) 
Regression Model 
Dln ERt =constant+ r7 ECt-1+ Sei Dln CPIt-i +SiiDln M2t-i +SJi Dln 
y
p
t-i + SVi Dln ERt-i + error term 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 








F(1,30) = 2.02 
F(2,25) = 0.45 
F(3,21) = 1.05 
a The F-statistic value is obtained by the variable deletion test. The figures 
in parentheses are the degrees of freedom 
 
6. The Granger-Causality Between Inflation and Economic 
Growth 
 
   Friedman (1977) argues that inflation leads to inflation uncertainty 
and that inflation uncertainty  adversely affects economic activity. 
Thus, in his view, there is no long-run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (the Phillips curve); instead, there could be a 
positive relationship between inflation and unemployment given that 
inflation and inflation uncertainty may adversely affect economic 
growth and raise unemployment. Ball (1992) later derived 
Friedman’s views formally in an asymmetric repeated information 
game where the public faces uncertainty about the monetary 
authority.  
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   Most empirical studies, such as Fischer (1993), De Gregorio (1993) 
and Bruno and Easterly (1995), suggest that high or hyper-inflation 
retard economic growth, although there could be a positive 
relationship between inflation and economic growth when the 
inflation rate is low. The debate remains on the cut-off point at which 
inflation retards economic growth. Bruno and Easterly (1998) 
suggest that the annual inflation rate above 40 percent is likely to 
lead to a growth crisis. Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) find that, in 
the case of transition economies, this cut-off point occurs when the 
annual inflation rate is about 50 percent. Sarel (1996) locates the 
break-point at which annual inflation rate affects economic growth is 
8 percent. For inflation rates greater than 8 p ercent, the effect is 
negative, statistically significant and strong. Below that rate, inflation 
does not have a significant effect on growth or it may even exhibit a 
slightly positive effect. Ghosh and Phillips (1998), using a large 
sample than Sarel’s, find a substantially lower threshold effect at 2.5 
percent annual inflation rate. They find that inflation is an important 
statistical determinant of growth. Cristofferson and Doyle (1998) 
argue that the negative relationship between inflation and growth, 
typically found in cross-country regressions, exists only in high-
frequency data and with extreme inflation observations. They find no 
cross-sectional correlation between long-run averages of growth and 
inflation in the full-sample, but detect a negative effect of inflation 
and growth for inflation rates higher than 40 percent. Khan and 
Senhadji (2000) examine this relationship separately for industrial 
and developing countries and suggest that “the threshold level of 
inflation above which inflation significantly slows growth is 
estimated at 1-3 percent for industrial countries and 7-11 percent for 
developing countries”. 
 
   Indonesia experienced rapid economic growth and transformation 
since the late 1960s. Indonesia also experienced moderately high and 
volatile inflation for most of the period since the 1950s. Such 
volatility originated from both policy reasons and supply/external 
shocks to an increasingly open economy. It remains an issue whether 
inflation had any impact on economic growth in Indonesia. 
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   Table 5 reports the Granger-causality test results. They suggest that 
there was no significant causal effect from inflation on economic 
growth for the complete or any sub-sample period. Mackie (1967) 
pointed out that the Indonesian economy was somehow immune 
from the adverse consequences of inflation even during the phase of 
high inflation in the 1950s and early 1960s. One possible reason for 
it could be the subsistence nature of the economy during that period. 
That the Indonesian economy did not suffer much from even 
moderately high or volatile inflation since the early 1970s is 
reassuring but needs further investigation.
7 
 




t = constant + r3 ECt-1 + Sbi Dln CPIt-i + Sgi Dln Mjt-i + Sni 
Dln y
p
t-i + error term 
(With Narrow Money Supply Growth, Dln M1) 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 
















F(1,44) = 0.05 
F(2,40) = 0.24 
F(3,36) = 0.36 
 
F(1,27) = 0.06 
F(2,24) = 0.46 
F(3,21) = 0.30 
 Regression Model 
Dln y
p
t = constant + r4 ECt-1 + Sbi Dln CPIt-i + Sgi Dln Mjt-i + Sni 
Dln y
p
t-i + error term 
(With broad Money Supply Growth, Dln M2) 
Lag-Adjusted Sample 
Period 








F(1,36) = 0.09 
F(2,32) = 0.60 
F(3,28) = 0.83 
Note: a   The F-statistic value is obtained by the variable deletion test. The 
figures in parentheses are the degrees of freedom 
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7. Summary and Conclusion  
 
   This paper has used annual data for the period 1954-2002 to 
investigate the causal relationship between money growth, 
inflation, currency devaluation and economic growth in 
Indonesia. Three testable hypotheses have been investigated: (1) 
does the money supply growth Granger-cause inflation? (2) does 
currency devaluation Granger-cause inflation? (3) does inflation 
affect economic growth? The empirical results suggest that there 
existed a short-run bi-directional causality between money supply 
growth and inflation and between  currency devaluation and 
inflation. For the complete sample period, the causality running 
from inflation to narrow money supply growth was stronger than 
that from narrow money supply growth to inflation. This result is 
consistent with the view that in a high-or hyperinflationary 
economy, inflation does have a feedback effect on money supply 
growth and this generates a self-sustaining inflationary process. 
The short-run bi-directional causality between currency 
devaluation and inflation was, however, weak or not so robust for 
the complete or any shorter sample period. On the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth, the results suggest that 
there was no short-run causality from inflation to economic 




1.This paper uses the data set in Hossain (2005b), which contains the 
definition of variables, data sources and a summary of the time series 
properties of variables used in the regression analysis. However, the 
detailed unit root test results are not reported in the paper but would be 
available from the author upon request. 
 
2.For the conduct of open-market operations, Bank Indonesia certificates 
and some money market securities, rather than the government-issued debt 
instruments were used. At the operational level, the monetary authorities’ 
main task was to keep the monetary aggregate at a level that was considered 
adequate for a pre-determined target rate of economic growth and to avoid 
creating internal-and external imbalances (Arndt, 1979; Grenville, 1981; 
Alamsyah, Joseph, Agung and Zulverdy, 2001).  International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-3(2005) 
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3.Under a fixed or pegged exchange rate system the domestic interest 
rate (i
d) is expected to move in tandem with the foreign interest rate (i
f) 
if there is freely mobile capital. This follows the i nterest rate parity 
condition: i
d = i
f +  d, where  d is the expected rate of depreciation of 
domestic currency against the anchor currency and should be zero under 
a credible fixed or pegged exchange rate system. 
 
4.This follows the purchasing power parity proposition: PT = NER • PT
* 
where P T is the price of tradables in domestic currency, NER is the 
fixed/pegged exchange rate and P T
* is the price of tradables in foreign 
currency.  
 
5.Nevertheless, Hill (1966:p.30) has somewhat generously praised the 
Soeharto government’s efforts for inflation control: 
 
  Until recently monetary policy instruments have been blunt 
and underdeveloped. But the regime has established a 
credible reputation for basically sound macroeconomic 
management: each burst of inflation has been followed by 
corrective intervention.   Unquestionably, one of the 
positive legacies of the bitter experience of the 1960s has 
been an aversion to high inflation. Indeed, as soon as 
inflation has approached the threshold of   double-
digit levels, alarm bells have sounded in the central bank 
and the Department of Finance and the response has 
generally been prompt. 
 
6.The results with the broad definition of money suggest no such 
relationship. 
 
7.The issue is under investigation by the author within the 
ARCH-GARCH modeling framework. 
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